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IF LABOR  IS INElASTIC,  ARE  TAXES  STILL DISTORTING? 
ABS  TRACT 
Three recent papers  measure  the marginal  excess burden  of labor 
taxes in  the  United  States.  They obtain very different  results  even 
where  they all use a zero uncompensated  labor  supply elasticity  and 
assume  that the additional  revenue  is spent  on a  public  good that is 
separable  in  utility.  The impression  is that other  parameters  must 
explain  the differences  in results. 
Yet each  paper  uses a different  concept  of  excess burden.  Nere,  I 
calculate  all three  measures  in one model  and show how conceptual 
differences  explain  the results.  Only one of these measures  isolates 
the distortionary  effects of taxes in  a way that depends  on the 
compensated  lsbor  supply  elasticity.  The other  two measures  incorporate 
income effects  and thus depend  on the actual  change  in labor.  This 
result  was obscured  because  those papers  report positive  marginal  excess 
burden  even with  a zero uncorspensated labor  supply  elasticity.  This 
paper  shows  conditions  under  which  their  measure  is zero, and it 
interprets  the measures  in light of  recent  literature. 
Don  Fullerton 
National  Bureau  of  Rconomic  Research 
1050 Massachusetts  Avenue 
Cambridge,  MA  02138 Much of welfare  economics  has been plagued by differences  in the 
concepts  used to  measure  changes  in consumer  welfare.  One example  of this 
problem  is presented  in striking  clarity  by the case of a  wage tax  when the 
uncompensated  labor supply  is vertical,  that is, when labor  is inelastic. 
Three  recent papers  in  the  American  Economic  Review  consider  this case, but 
they reach very  different  conclusions. 
All three  papers  calculate  the  "marginal  excess  burden"  of  a  dollar  of 
additional  tax revenue  in the case where  labor  is inelastic  and  where  the 
marginal  dollar  is spent on  a public  good that  is separable  in utility. 
Their  results are summarized  in Table  1.  Charles  Stuart  (1984) builds  a 
simple  two-sector  general  equilibrium  model and finds in  this case that 
"marginal  excess  burden"  is  7 cents.  Charles  Ballard,  John Shoven,  and John 
Whalley  (1985) use a  more complicated  general  equilibrium  model  where their 
"marginal  excess  burden"  is 12 cents.  Edgar  Browning  (1987) employs a 
simple  partial  equilibrium  model and  obtains  a corresponding  figure  of  21 
cents.  He  concludes  that "almost all of the differences  in results  can  be 
traced  to different  assumptions  about  key parameter  values"  (p.11). 
Certainly  the results  are  sensitive  to assumptions  about  the marginal 
tax rate,  the degree  of  progressiviry,  the  use of the revenue,  and the 
compensated  and  uncompensared  labor  supply  elasticities.  As I  show in this 
paper,  however,  almost  all of the differences  in these  cited  results  can  be 
rraced  to differences  in their  definitions  of  marginal  excess burden. 
These  three  papers have been  discussed  in  other  papers  that introduce 
new models  and further definitions.1  Some confusion  remains,  so one purpose 
of this paper  is to clarify  the different  definitions  and reconcile  the 
1See, e.g.,  Ballard  (1987), Ingcmsr Hansson  and Stuart  (1988), Robert  Tricst 
(1988), Shaghil  Ahmed  and  Oman  Groushorc  (1988), and  Joram  Msyshsr  (l9B8a). different  results.  The  main contribution  of this paper,  however,  is that  I 
return  to the exact  model of Stuart, replicate  his result, and add  calculs- 
tions for the other  two definitions  of  marginal  excess  butden  O4EB).2 I also 
show  how Stuart's  general  equilibrium  model  reduces to  Browning's  partial 
equilibrium  model.  Thus I am  ahle  to show all three  measures  in  Btowning's 
model as  well.  The first  section  relates these  three  papers  to some others 
in the literature.  The second  section illustrates  the different  concepts  of 
welfare,  and the third  section  performs  the actual  calculations. 
I.  Discussion 
The standard  public  finance textbook  defines  excess burden  of  a wage 
tax  as the difference between  consumet  welfare under  that tax  and  under a 
lump sum  tax  with the same revenue  (e.g. Harvey Rosen,  19B5, Joseph 
Stiglitz,  198).  Synonyms  include welfare  cost, efficiency  cost, or  dead- 
weight  loss.  In the literature,  much discussion  involves  the choice  of 
consumer  welfare  measure.3  For  a change from the original  equilibrium  with 
a  pra-existing  wage tax,  Stuart uses  the compensating  surplus  (CS), Ballard, 
Shoven,  and  Whalley  use the equivalent  variation  (EV), and  Browning  uses the 
compensating  variation  (CV).  Together  with the  equivalent  surplus  (ES) 
these  constitute  "The Four  Consumer's  Surpluses"  of Sit  John  Hicks (1943), 
as renamed  in Hicks  (1954). 
- 
°Stuart (1984)  and  Ballard  (19B7) perform  two kinds of policy  experiments. 
Using  Ballard's  terms,  revenue  is spent by government  in  a  "balanced-budget" 
experiment,  and it  is returned  as a  lump sum transfer  in  a "differential" 
experiment.  Here, I consider  only one experiment  and  calculate  different 
measures.  Balanced  budget  spending  is the only  experiment  that appears  in 
all three  papers, but that  one equilibrium  outcome  is described  very 
differently  by  the three  burden measures. 
3See,  e.g.,  Peter  Diamond  and  Daniel McFadden  (1974), John Kay (1980), Alan 
Auerbach  and  Rosen  (1980), and  Mayshar  (1988b). The distinction  among welfare  measures  is important  fot  total  excess 
botden,  but  not fot small  changes whete  all such measures  are  vety close  to 
each otherA The big difference  among  the three  papers  that I  review  is 
introduced  by the revenue figure  subtracted.  Browning  subtracts  the change 
* 
in  revenue  along  the compensated  labor  supply  curve  (dR ),  and  divides  this 
*  difference by the actual change  in revenue  (dR).  His  Y1EB  is  (CV-dR  )/dR. 
Stuart  subtracts  the  actual  change  in revenue and  calculates  (CS-dR)/dR. 
Ballard,  Shoven,  and  Whalley  calculate  (RV-dR)/dR.5  Because  the welfare 
measures  CS  and  EV  are  numerically  close  for small  changes,  the latter 
two  !1EB  measures  are  always  similar  in  my results below. 
Given the textbook  definition  of total  excess burden,  a  corresponding 
concept  at the  margin  would  compare  the increment  in the wage tax to a small 
lump sum tax with the same revenue  (Auerbach,  l9BS).  Only Browning's 
concept  of "marginal  excess burden"  corresponds  to this definition.  His 
measure  depends  on the matginal  tax rate and on the compensated  labot  supply 
elasticity.  It  is positive  in the special case where  labor is "inelastic," 
so he would  answer  that the tax is still  distorting.  Unfortunately,  though, 
Browning  leaves  the incorrect  impression  that the cost-benefit  analyst 
should  use one  plus his marginal  excess  burden  (l+MEB)  as the marginal 
cost of funds  (MCF).  This  MCF  can be defined as the change  in consumer 
welfare  (CS, EV,  or  CV)  divided by the actual  change  in revenue  (dR).  In 
the case  where  labor  does not change, the  HCF  equals  one.5 
'Mayshar  (l9BBb) provides  a formal proof of their equivalence  at the margin. 
5They  never  state  this expression  explicitly,  however,  so others  misunder- 
stand  what was calculated.  Triest  (19BB) assumes that this MEB is measured 
in pre-tax  prices,  when it is actually  in prices  of the original  cue-tax 
equilibrium.  Mayshar  (l9BBb) introduces tV-dR  as a "new" measure,  not 
knowing  that  this is the measure  of  Ballard,  Shaven,  and  Whalley. 
6This result  is in  Anthony  Atkinson  and Nicholas  Stern  (1974), Stuart (1982), -4- 
The best intuition  for  this result derives  from Atkinson  and  Stern 
(1974).  They isolate  three  reasons to deviate  from the conventional  rule of 
Paul Samuelson  (1954)  that the sum of  the  marginal  rates of substiturion 
(MRS) should equal  the marginal  rare of rransformarion  (MRT).  The first 
modification  is that  revenue  may  be affected  by any complemenrarity  or 
substitutability  between  the public project  and the taxed  good.  All three 
papers  ignore  this possibility.  Second, the rule  is modified  if taxes  are 
not  lump  sum.  This "disrortionary  effecr" of  Atkinson  and  Stern  is measured 
by  Browoing's  paper.  Third,  the rule is modified  for income  effects  that 
change  the amount  of the taxed  good.  This "revenue  effect"  of  Atkinson  and 
Stern  exactly  offsets  the disrorrionary  effect  in the special  case  where 
actual  labor does  not change.  The project  is worthwhile  if  XMRS>MRT,  which 
means  that the  MCF—1. 
The  measures  of  Stuart  and  of Ballard,  Shoven,  and  Whalley  effectively 
combine the disrorrionary  effect and the revenue effect.  As can  be seen 
from  the  above  formulas,  they define  "marginal  excess burden"  as the 
marginal  cost of funds minus  one.7  With  this definition,  the cost-benefit 
analyst  use  (l+MEB)  as the  MCF.  In  the special  case  where  labor  does 
not change and the  MCF—1,  however,  this  1155  is zero.  Because  of the 
terminology  of  excess  burden,  they leave  the incorrect  impression  that the 
tax is not "distorting."  The wage tax j  disrorring  in  the conventional 
sense that it leaves  consumers  worse off than a lump sum  tax. 
In addition,  with  a  pre-exisring  wage tax and  1155  defined  as  MCF-l, 
David  Wildasin  (1954), Ballard  (19B7), Triest  (1985), Mayshar (1988a,b), and 
others.  Also,  Wildasin  shows  that Browning  ceuld  use  l+MEB  for the  MCF 
if  he  had assumed  that the public  good has  no effect  on  compensated  labor 
supply.  Instead,  Browning  assumes no  effect  on actual  labor  supply. 
7Papers  that  use similar definitions  include  Stuart  (1982), Ballard  (1987), 
Ahmed  and Croushore  (1988), and  Mayshar  (19881), among  others. a lump sum tax  increment has a negative  "marginal  excess  burden"  The  lump 
sum increment  has no  distortionary  eifect,  hut it has a revenue  eifect 
because  it reduces  disposable  income  and thus causes  an increase  in labor 
subject  to the  wage tax. 
For  these  reasons,  some say that  MCF-l  should  not be  called  "marginal 
excess burden"  but  should  instead be called  "marginal  welfare  cost,"  (e.g. 
Ballard,  1987) or "marginal  efficiency  cost"  (e.g. David  Bizer  and Stuart, 
1987).  These terms  are generally  regarded  as synonyms,  however. 
I conclude  that  MCF-l  should not be used  to define g  concept  like 
marginal  excess burden,  welfare  cost, efficiency  cost, or deadweight  loss. 
All  such definitions  leave  the incorrect  impression  that the  wage tax  is  not 
distorting.  The marginal  cost of funds  is the relevant  concept  in  any  case, 
so the  cost-benefit  analyst  must simply  add back the one subtracted. 
Finally,  the fundamental  difference  among  the three  definitions  of 
"marginal  excess burden"  is obscured by  the  fact that Stuart  (1984)  reports 
7 cents and Ballard,  Shoven, and  Whalley  report  12 cents,  even though the 
uncompensared  labor  supply  elasticity  is  zero.  Ballard  (1987)  shows  that 
this measure  of "MEB"  is zero in a simple model when the uncompensated  labor 
supply  elasticity  is zero, and  he concludes  that complications  in the models 
(discussed  below)  lead to  non-zero  results.  As shown in Stuart  (1982) and 
Mayshar  (1988b),  however,  the condition  for  MCF'l  (or that this "MEB"—O)  is 
not that the uncompensated  elasticity be zero but that actual  labor  supply 
be unchanged.  In  more general  models,  labor supply  can  be affected  by 
income and by  prices  other  than the net  wage.  In simulations  below,  using 
the model of Stuart,  I show that a  non-zero  uncoopensated  labor  supply 
elasticity  can exactly offset  these  other  income  and price  changes  such that 
the actual  labor  supply  is unchanged  and  this  "MiS"  is zero. II. Concepts  of Excess  Burden 
Figure  1 depicts  the choice between  leisure  (ou the  horizontal  axis) 
and labor which  earns  units of the numeraire  good denoted  in dollars  (on the 
vertical  axis).  A  proportional  tax on labor pivots  the  budget  around  its 
horizontal  intercept,  to a flatter line marked  "new  prices.'  In the special 
case of inelastic  labor,  the new  choice  point B must lie  directly  below  the 
initial point  A.  Tax  revenue  is this vertical  distance,  AB,  in dollars. 
Government  is assumed  to spend  the revenue  in  a manner  that  does  not affect 
the labor-leisure  choice,  so the public  good is separable  in  utility. 
The equivalent  variation,  distance  AC in the diagram,  is the number  of 
dollars taken away from the consumer  at old  prices  that would  reduce  utility 
by  an amount  "equivalent"  to the tax.  Since AC  exceeds  revenue  AB,  the 
excess burden  is BC (Kay, 1980).  The  compensating  variation,  distance  DF, 
is the number  of dollars  at  new  prices  that  would  "compensate"  for  the tax 
and  raise  utility  back to the old  level.  Excass burden  in this case  is OF 
sinus  EF,  the revenue  that would  occur  at new  prices  if the consumer ir 
compensated  (Diamond  and  McFadden,  1974).  Using  the two  variation  measures, 
excess  burden  is related  to  a  compensated  change  in labor  supply. 
The less commonly  used  compensating  surplus  is the amount  of the 
numeraire  good  that  must be added to the consumer's  new  bundle  to reach  the 
old  utility,  the distance  from  B  back to A.  The consumer  may not re- 
optimize.  Stuart  (1982) notes  that both  the  MET  and  ZMES  are  measured 
in terms of  a  particular  cosssodity  and that the compensating  surplus  can 
measure welfare  in the same  commodity.8  The compensating  surplus  is exactly 
tIt is perfectly  consistent,  however,  to measure  costs and  benefits  of the 
public  project  by income  equivalents  and  use  the  EV.  Besides,  Slutsky equal  to revenue  in this case, so Stuart's  measure of excess  burden  is zero. 
Using  this measure  with inelastic  labor,  the tax is entirely  nondistotting. 
His measure  yields  zero  'marginal  excess burden"  in  this model.  The reason 
he obtains  7 cents  is explained below,  but in  general his marginal  excess 
burden  is related  to the actual  change  in  labot  supply. 
In  contrAst,  Browning  follows  the standard  approach.  The  wage tax is 
still distorting  even though  labor supply  does not  change,  because  a lump 
sum tax with the same revenue would  leave the consumer on  a  higher 
indifference  curve.  Browning's  actual  calculations  can  be described  using 
Figure  2, where  the gross  wage  is fixed  at  w.  The marginal  tax rare  a 
may exceed  the average  tax rare  t.  The initial net  wage is  w(l-m°),  and 
labor supply  is  L. 
Initial  excess burden  is rho area ABC, the area 
between  the tax  wedge AC and the compensated  labor  supply  curve  S.  When 
the marginal  tax rate  is increased  by  dm (—m'  -m°), this measure  of excess 
burden  increases  by the shaded  area, ACCE.  Actual  labor supply  is still 
0  *  but  compensated  labor  is  L1.  The change in  excess  burden  is: 
*  ACUE  —  ACHE  -  (EDFH-ACFC)  —  CV  - dR  ,  (1) 
where  ACHE is the compensating  variation,  EDFH is the revenue  at the new 
rate  m'  when the consumer  is compensated,  and  ACFC is the revenue  at the 
old  rate  m0.  In  other  words,  the change  in  excess  burden  is the  CV  minus 
* 
dR  ,  the  change  tn  revenue measured  at marginal  rates  along the compensated 
curve.  This formula  corresponds  to Auerbach  (l9g5, p.72). 
Alternatively,  with no initial tax, excess burden  can be defined  as the 
(undated) shows  that results depend  on the choice of reference  commodity. equivalent  variation  minus  actual  revenue.  This measure  also  compares  the 
wage  tax to a lump sum tax.  With  a pre-exisring  wage tax, however,  the 
corresponding  concept  at the margin  would  compare  a small additional  wage 
tax to an  equal-yield  lump sum increment.  Auerbach  (1985, p.72)  shows  that 
such  a  measure  also requires  a  calculation  of the change  in  revenue  along a 
compensated  curve.  This  point  could  be demonstrated  using  a figure  that 
looks just like Figure  2, except  that consumers  are  held to the  utility 
level  along  when  m°  is raised  to  m'  .  Then ACHE  is the equivalent 
variation,  and  is the change  in  revenue  using  marginal  rates while 
holding  to the new  utility.  The  change  in excess  burden  is ACDE.  Thus the 
CV  and  EV  measures  converge  as the tax change  gets  very small. 
For total  excess burden,  Ballard,  Shoven  and  Whalley  use the equivalent 
variation,  and they subtract  actual revenue.  For "marginal  excess  burden," 
however,  they subtract  the  actual  change  in  revenue  rather  than the  change 
along a compensated  curve.  Thus  their  "marginal  excess  burden"  is not the 
increase  in their  total excess  burden  for a small  increase  in the tax.  In 
fact, for the simple  model of  Figure  1, they would get large  total  excess 
burden  and (approximately)  zero "marginal excess  burden." 
To  see this point,  consider  a small wage tax  with no  other  distortions 
in  Figure  1.  When the equivalent  variation  AC and the revenue  AB are both 
arbitrarily  small,  the excess  burden  BC is approximately  zero.  Only  as the 
tax  becomes  large  does  the excess burden  become  noticeable.  How reinterpret 
Figure  1 so that "old prices"  represent  a large pre-exisring  wage tax, and 
"new  prices"  indicate  a small additional  tax.  Then the equivalent  variation 
AC and  the actual  change  in revenue AB  are still arbitrarily  small.  The 
difference,  BC, is the "marginal  excess burden"  of  Ballard,  Shoven,  and 
Whalley.  It is near zero  for the same reason  that the excess burden  of  a small  tax  is near zero, as if they  ignore the  pre-existing  tax. 
Thus  Ballard,  Shoven,  and Whalley  use a measure  that yields  zero 
"marginal  excess burden"  in this simple  model with inelastic  labor.  The 
reason  they obtain  12 cents  is discussed  below. 
III. The  Calculation  of Marginal  Excess  Burden 
* 
For  the change  in  excess  burden,  Browning  assumes  that  S  is linear 
and  calculates  the shaded  area of  Figure  2.  Thfs assumption  is  unimportant, 
however,  because S only needs  to be approximately  lindmr over a small 
range.  Thus the ares  (CV.dR*)  is  0.5(wm°+wm')(L-L). 
The compensated 
change  in labor  is 
[vjL/(l-m°fldm,  where  q  is the compensated  labor 
supply  elasticity,  and  dm  is the change  in marginal  rate.  Actual  labor 
supply L does not  change.  If  dt  is the change  in  averagm  tax rate, 
then  dR—wLdt  is the actual  change  in  revenue.  Thus  Browning  calculates:9 
*  0 
CV  - dR  —  [a + 0.5dm]  dm 
(2) 
L  1-m"  - 
The parameter  dm/dr  indicates  the progressivity  of the tax change. 
Assuming  that the change  maintains  progressivity,  dm/dt  is the  same as 
r—m/t  in Stuart's  paper.  Browning  sets the  initial  m—.43  and  t—.  31,  so 
dm/dt  is  1.39.  He also sets  dm—.01  and  9—0.2,  so equation  (2) yields 
21 cents for "marginal  excess  burden"  as shown  in Table  1.  The measure  in 
°Browning  prefers  his other  case,  where  government  spending  restores  the 
original  utility  level and thus has an  income  effect  on labor  supply.  This 
other  case  is not the same as Stuart's  other  case where  the revenue  is 
returned  lump sum (since  the latter  is not  enough  to reach  the old utility). 
I use the case where  public  spending  has no effect  on labor, because  it is 
the only case considered  by all three  papers. -10- 
(2) clearly  increases  with the  marginal  tax rare  m,  the progressivity 
dm/dt,  and the compensated  elasticity  rj. 
To substitute  Stuart's  parameters,  set  m—.427,  t—.273,  and  r—l.544. 
The "liES" from equation  (2) is then 24 cents  as shown in  Table  1.  Thus  the 
difference  in  published  results  is not due to  parameters.'° 
To calculate  his "marginal  excess burden'  in  a  general  equilibrium 
model,  Stuart  first  assumes  that  a single  aggregate  consumer  has an 
endowment  L  that can be supplied  to th€  market  sector  as labor  or 
used in home production  as leisure  L2: 
L—L1+L2  (3) 
Also, production  in each sector  is Cobb-Douglas: 
Y. — 




,  (5) 
where capital  stocks  in  each sector  are constant  and  hence  subsumed  in  A 




,  (6) 
where  'l  and 
'12 
are consumption  of  the two outputs.  The  6  is a 
"minimum  required  purchase,"  m is a share parameter,  and  the elasticity  of 
substitution  is  a  — l/(l-p).  The nonmarket  sector has  no tax,  so  — 
12 
''In the model of Ballard,  Shoven,  and  Whalley,  each of 12 households  has 
irs own linear  tax function  with its own  m,  t,  and  v. -lI- 
The market  sector  pays tax 
twL1, so  is less than 
Y1.  The government 
spends  marginal  revenue  on the market  good. 
The Appendix  further  describes  the  derivation  of  parameters  and 
solution  of the  model.  Using  equilibrium  outcomes,  the compensating  surplus 
is derived  from equation  (6) and  U(Y,4) 
— U(Yj+CSY: 
cs  — 
[(o)-P 
+ [(.6)  (6) 
1(l-m)/o]" 
-  .  (7) 
The Appendix  also describes  the additional  steps  necessary  to calculate 
rho other  memsures.  It derives  the expenditure  function  E(P,U) —  UP  + 
SF2, 
where 
P2  is the price  of the nonmarket  good, and  P  is a  composite  index 
of the two output  prices.  Then:11 
LV  — E(P°,U') 
- E(P°,U°) —  P°(U' -U°)  and  (B) 
CV  — NC?'  ,U')  - E(P' ,U°) — P'(U'-U°)  ,  (9) 
but the signs  get reversed  to measure  the loss as a  positive  amount.  Stuart 
calculates  (CS-dR)/dR  and  Ballard,  Shoven, and  Whalley  calculate 
(EV-dR)/dR.  Finally,  the appendix  derives  the compensated  quantities  and 
*  .  * 
revenue  change  dR  needed  to calculate  Browntng's  (CV-dR  )/dR. 
Usiog  Stuart's  model  with Stuart's  parameters,  I simulate  a  one percent 
increase  in the  marginal  tax  rare  m.  Stuart's  measure  of "marginal  excess 
''Equations  (B) and (9) follow  Varian  (19B4, p.264),  where the  LV  and  CV 
are both  positive  for  a utility  gain.  Note that  E(P'  ,U')  is equal  to  I', 
so the  LV  in (B) is  -[E(P'  ,U')-E(P°,U')]  + (I?I0).  In  other  words,  it 
includes  both the change  in  consumer  surplus and the change  in  money  income. 
The  LV  in Auerbach  (1965)  is only  the change  in consumer  surplus.  These 
definitions  differ  here because  money  income changes.  To  help clarify  this 
distinction,  the concepts  in (8) and  (9) are called  the "equivalent  gain" 
and "compensating  gain" by King  (1983). -12- 
burden"  is 7 cents,  just ss in published  results.  Table 1 shows that the 
measure  of Ballard,  Shoven, and Whalley  is also  7 cents.  Using  the same 
equilibrium  outcome,  however,  Browning's  measure  is 25 ceuts.  Thus  the 
results  differ because  the measurer  differ. 
When labor  is inelastic  in Figure  1,  Stuart's  measure  was shown  to 
provide  zero excess burden.  So why  does  he get 7 cents?  The reason  is that 
this simulation  in  his model  with a zero uncoispensated labor elasticity  does 
not lead to zero  change  in  actual  labor  suppl\. 
Ballard  (198?) gets zero "marginal  excess  burden"  in a  similar  model 
with a  flat  wage tax, and  he concludes  that Stuart did not get zero  because 
of  progressivity.  It  is true that  this  change  in the progressive  tax 
structure  effectively  changes  the "virtual"  income of the consumer,  but the 
point here is that  this  "MEg" will  not be zero whenever  any aspect  of the 
reform  causes  a change  in  income  or in  other  prices  that leads to a  general 
equilibrium  response  in the quantity of  labor. 
To sec  his parameters,  Stuart  differentiates  labor  supply  with respect 
to the net  wage and imposes  three conditions:  the  uncnmpensated  labor  supply 
elasticity  is  zero,  the compensated 'i  is  .2, and the  initial  F2 
is  I. 
The implied  6  is  1968.36,  a  is  .9429, and  p  is  1.0625.  This 
procedure  is consistent  with the definition  of  an elasticity,  since  the 
differentiation  varies  only the net  wage and  holds  all  other  prices 
constant.  As an alternative  procedure,  I search a three-dimensional  grid 
for values  of  6, m, and p  that satisfy  three  conditions  for  this 
simulation  in general equilibrium:  , 
—  .2,  F 
— 1,  and actual  labor  does 
not  change.  The resulting  parameters  are  6—1720.44,  m—.9300,  and  p—2.2lBO. 
In this case the same one percent  increase  in m  leaves  actual  labor  un- 
changed,  and the Table  shows  that Stuart's  measure  is exactly  zero. -13- 
These new  parameters  should  not be preferred  to Stuart's.  Indeed,  they 
imply  that the uncompensated  labor  supply elasticity  is not  exactly  zero. 
They are used  here only  to clarify  rhe important  conceptual  point  that 
Stuart's  measure  is zero when  actual  labor  supply  does not  change.  This 
point was obscured  in Stuart's  paper  because  readers naturally  thought  that 
his  7 cent figure  was  comparable  to  Browning's  21 cent figure. 
Using  these new parameters,  the measure  of  Ballard,  Shoven,  and  Whalley 
is  also zero.  So why do they get 12 cents?  Their  uncompensated  elasticity 
is similarly  set to zero  in  a  model  with progressive  taxes and  with  varying 
prices,  so their  actual  labor  supply also changes.  In  addition,  as  pointed 
our by Ballard  (1987), they  have  other  taxes  that introduce  second-best 
effects.  The simulation here demonstrates  that they would  find zero 
"marginal  excess  burden"  if they reduced  their model to one consumer,  two 
sectors,  no other  taxes,  and  unchanged  supply  of labor.'2 
The  model of  Ballard,  Shoven,  and  Whalley  is net  used  here to calculate 
* 
the  three different  measures.  The reason  is that  the calculation  of  dR 
would  be extremely  difficult  in  a model with  many tax instruments.  It would 
require net  only the compensated  labor supply, but also the compensated 
demand for each coenodity,  the sales  tax on each compensated  quantity,  and 
all factor  taxes on  producers  at those quantities.'3 
As shown in  Table  1, the use  of these new  parameters  reduces  all three 
'2The point of this paper  does not  arise when their measure  is  used in  a 
revenue neutral  reform,  as in  every  previous  application  of their  model. 
They use  (B), the "equivalent  gain" of King (1981). 
'3Hansson and Stuart  (1988) point  out this difficulty with the Browning 
measure.  In this case, one could  solve numerically  for the lump sum  tax 
that is "equivalent"  in  terms  of utility  to the simulated  tax change.  irh 
more consumers,  however,  one  needs  to solve  for more  "equivalent"  tax 
amounts.  Alternatively,  the revenue could  be returned  as lump sum gifts 
while jusr  using  the  CV  or  EV.  In  Stuart's  model,  with  one consumer, 
this alternative  is extremely  close  to the Browning  measure. -  14- 
measures  of  marginal  excess  burden.  While  the first  two  fall from 7 cents 
to zero,  Browning's  measure  falls  from 25 cents  to 20 cents. 
Finally,  I impose  partial  equilibrium  conditions  on Stuart's  model by 
setting  a—A—b—B—l.  In this case,  Y1—L1 
and 
Y2—L2, 
so the consumer's 
problem  reduces  to that of  Figure  1.  An additional  grid search  is performed 
to impose  the  three  conditions  discussed  above  ('7—2, P-l, and actual  labor 
unchanged).  The necessary  utility  parameters  are  6—2052.31,  o—.7420,  and 
p—.SSlO.  In  this case,  Stuart's  model  reduces exactly  to Browning's  model. 
Table 1 shows  that Browning's  9IEB"  is 24  cents while  the other  measures  are 
zero.  Browning's  partial  equilibrium  model  therefore  overstates his own  14EB 
by  20 percent  relative  to a comparable  general  equilibrium  model. 
IV. Conclusion 
In  all of these  calculations,  the compensating  and equivalent 
variations  are  very close to the compensating  surplus.  In Figure  1,  the 
vertical  distance  between  the two indifference  curves  is always  close to the 
distance  between  two parallel  price  lines.  The  big difference  is introduced 
* 
by the revenue  figure  subtracted.  Browning  subtracts  dR  and thus compares 
the distorting  tax increase  to a lump sum increment  with the same revenue. 
The other two  measures  are  always  similar  to each  other  because  they both 
subtract  the actual change  in  revenue.  These  other  measures  are zero in 
Stuart's  model  when actual  labor  supply  is unchanged. 
With only the distortionary  effect, Browning's  "marginal  excess burden" 
is a familiar  concept.  It is analogous  to a concept of total  excess burden 
that compares  the whole tax to a lump sum tax.  However,  it is not enough 
information  to set public  spending.  Wirh the addition  of the revenue 
effect,  the other two  measures  do provide  enough  information  to decide  on a -15- 
project  that is separable  in  utility.  Because  they are zero  for a 
distorting  tax, however,  they should not be called marginal  excess burden, 
welfare  cost,  efficiency  cost, or deadweight  loss.  They are defined  as the 
marginal  cost of funds  minus  one, but there  is really no need for any 
concept  other than the  MGF  itself.  Given  the tax  used to fund it,  the 
project  is worthwhile  if tho benefits  exceed  the  MGF. 
An  important  implication  Is that the decision  to fund a  public  project 
depands  irrevocably  on the nature  of the project.  The assumption  that the 
project has no effect  on labor  supply may  be convenient,  but it is unlikely 
to be  valid.  The  best procedure  is to specify  the particular  project  in the 
utility  of  consumers,  including any  complementarity  to labor  or leisure,  and 
then calculate  whether  the  tax and spending  package  increases  welfare. Table  1 
Different  Measures  of "  rvinal  Excess  Burden'  for US. Labor  Taxes 
* 
(CS-dR)/dR  (EV-dR)/dE  (CU-dR  )/dR 
(Stuart)  (85W)  (Brownine) 
From  the  lireraturea 
Stuart  (1984)  .07  -  -  - - 
Eallard-Shoven-Whalley (1985) 
-  -  .12  -  - 
Etowning (1987)  - -  -  .21 
Using  Browning's modeib 
with Stuart's  parameters  .24 
Using  Stuart's  model° 
calculate  other  measures  .07  .07  .25 
labor  unchanged  in  general  equil.  .00  .00  .20 
labor  unchanged  in  partial  equil.  .00  .00  .24 
CS—compensating  surplus,  EU—equivalent  variation,  CU—compensating 
variation  dR—change  in actual  revenue using  average  tax rates,  and 
* 
dR  —change  in  revenue  on  toapensated  curve, ustng  marginal  rates. 
a. Estimates  from  the literature  all  employ  a  zero  uncoapensated  labor 
supply elasticity  where  additional  revenue is spent on government 
consumption,  but they differ  on  other  assumptions. 
b. The other  assumptions  borrowed  from Stuart's  model  are: q—.2  for the 
compensated  labor  supply  elasticity;  a—.427  for the marginal  tax  rate; 
and  r—da/dr—l.S64  for the constant  ratio of the marginal  tax rate to 
the average  tax rate. 
c.  It is not  possible  to  use the same assumptions  in the  Eallard-Shoven- 
Whalley  model,  for reasons described  in the text. $ 
leisure 
Figure 
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Appendix: General  Equilibrium  Welfare  Effecrs 
In Stuart's  model,  rhe only tax is on labor in the market  sector. 
Total  revenue  is split  between  redistributions,  Tr, and government  spending, 
C.  Marginal  revenue  is spent  only on C,  so: 
C—  g0+ twL1  (Al) 
First  order conditions  provide  the relative  price: 
—  (A2) 
where  the first good is numeraire 
(P1—l). 
Stuart uses competitive  behavior, 
equilibrium  conditions,  and  specifications  for parameters  (L, m,  r,  A,  a,  B, 
b, 6, a, p. and 
g0) 
to obtain  ten equations  in ten unknowns  (r, L1,  "1 
y2,  "2  w, C, and Tr).  A simple iteration  solves  the model, 
From sources  in the literature,  Stuart  sets  the initial  m—,427  ond 
t—.273,  so  r—l,564.  From  the Economic  Report  of  the President,  he sets the 
initial  C—227.7  billion  dollars  for 1976.  Out oi a maximum  L—3660  hours 
per  year,  the  average  employable  person works  L1—100S.14 
hours.  From the 
Survey  of  Current  Business,  Stuart  sets  — 1127.4  - 227.7  1299.7,  and 
a—.  72,  so  A  must  be 10.506.  Me also uses .72 for  h, and  1  for  the 




— 300,2  billion,  so from (Al),  g0 
must be  C - 
rwL1 
— -72.5  billion. 
Stuart  makes a small error  in reporting  that  g0 
is -63,1, but the 
correct  value only changes his  marginal  excess burden  slightly. 
To add calculations  for the compensating  and  equivalent  variations,  it 
is convenient  to reformulate  the model  in terms oi  demands: -A2  - 
—  a 
(l.P26)/[a  +(l-a)  P2 
and  (A3) 
— S  + ()J(3pfl/pCIUy)CpiC]  (p.4) 
Substitution  back into  (6) yields  the indirect  utility  function: 
V(?I) — 
(I-P28)/E 
where  E  — t+(i.o)mP2l0]) 
.  (A5) 
P  is the composite  price,  an index of  and  2'  Solution  for  I 
yields  the  the expenditure  function  E(P,U) — UP +  8P2. 
To calculate  Browning's  measure  using  this model,  I  follow Auerbach 
*  0 
(lSBS,  p.75).  He  defines  dR  as  (R'-R ),  where  V  is the difference 
between  the  new producer  price and  the  new consumer  price  all times the 
compensated  quantity,  and  R°  is the old  price differenoe  times  the old 
0- 
quantity.  To get the compensated  demand  Y2, 
I use  U P'  in  place of 
(I-P26)  in  equation  (A4),  Production  Y2  equals  that  demand.  Hext  I use 
equarions  (3),  (4), and  (5) to solve  for the production  possibility 
frontier,  the maximum '4  that  can  be  produced  for 
'4.  Taxable  labor 
income  is then 4,  but the amount 
m(a'4) 
is expressed  in  units of  the 
production  good  Y1.  The consumption  good  Y1 
is the numeraire.  Since  the 
consumer  price  P1=l 
includes  the tax, the producer  price of  is only 
(l-m)  The change  in  revenue  along  the compensated  curve ceasured  in units 
of  the  numeraire  at new prices  is: 
dR  - tm(a'4)m0(a'4)](l.m) 
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